

D R A F T

7 January 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, ICAPS

Subject: Ad Hoc Committee Meeting on DCI Directive on
Exploitation of Captured Documents, and Foreign
Press and Publications

1. A meeting of the IAC Ad Hoc Committee on 7 January 1948 was notable for its futility. The general proposal offered in DCI 1/5 ^(ind #1) seemed at first fairly non-controversial. At the meeting, however, it appeared that there was general agreement only on the following points:

(a) That the subject of captured documents was a huge and important one;

(b) That something should be done about it;

(c) That no one was doing anything about it in an efficient way.

There seemed to be no general agreement on the subject of foreign press and publications.

2. I should think that the logical inference would be that there is a crying need for some central authority to take over direction of these problems. Once the discussion had broken open, it appeared that we were somewhat at fault in not having a detailed program to present, of just what we wanted to do. Thus, the IAC members objected to the idea that CIA would exploit captured documents and foreign periodicals. I think actually that we were not far apart on what was intended. I believe that CIA felt primary ex-

*More specifically
on following program
in report on 1/10/48*

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documents in question and that CIA's responsibility was to make sure that complete and final exploitation would be insured, as well as exploitation of material not deemed of interest by the individual department. I can see no logical objection to such a program.

3. I feel further that it was the purpose of CIA to make final disposition, or to arrange the final disposition by others, under a uniform set of rules of all such foreign documents. This would tie in with the exploitation idea outlined above and would require a knowledge of what material there was, how and where it was kept, and, in effect, a central carding file. The main objection to this, expressed vehemently by State representatives, seemed to be that the job was too big and couldn't be done. This does not seem to me to be an adequate reason for evading the responsibility to exploit all possible sources of national intelligence insofar as possible.

4. No one in his right mind would volunteer to do the job CIA seems to be asking for, but since it is willing to try, it seems that the other agencies have no valid grounds for objection. ^{PH} Colonel Sherman kept repeating what seems to be a central point -- a placing of responsibility. If the responsibility is placed, it requires some measure of control to do the job. If these points are true, as I believe them to be, the draft directive of the board becomes

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meaningless. They agreed that a survey was necessary. I believe this survey is essentially a survey of information materials, and needs no other authority than that contained in NSCID 1, paragraph 2. The other IAC members argued first that a survey of material should be ordered by ^aDCI directive (which, in view of the previous sentence, seems somewhat ridiculous) and, further, that the proposed survey was, in effect, a survey of activities, particularly insofar as it affected the foreign publications and press, and, consequently, a NSC directive ^{would be} ~~is~~ necessary to authorize it. Even if it were a survey of activities (which I do not believe), if it were necessary, the IAC could agree to it and it could issue ~~as~~ a DCI, to which no one could object. On the survey question, therefore, I believe the IAC members were either relieving NSCID 1, paragraph 2, of any meaning, or were proposing to throw back to the NSC the type of question with which, I believe, the NSC has no desire to be bothered.

5. For the rest of the IAC proposed directive which provided for indexing, etc., only by agreement with the intelligence heads or with the IAC, the very theory of the DCI becomes meaningless. DCI can issue only with the concurrence of all IAC members. If, therefore, a DCI provides that something can be done only by agreement with IAC or its members, it is completely meaningless.

6. The entire discussion, or argument, showed that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, representing the departments and agencies outside of CIA, maintain the ^{action}~~position~~ which we thought the NSC had ~~explored~~, that the Director has no control but is merely an equal among equals who seeks to get cooperation. Cooperation, in their expressed opinion, is the true meaning of his legal duty to coordinate. ^{But} whatever he does and however he does it, the Director will be held responsible by the NSC, Congress, and the country for any failure to produce all intelligence pertaining to the national security. If he can do this only by requesting cooperation, the task is hopeless. Therefore, DCI's must have some teeth in them and must assign responsibility. This is underlined by the vehemence of the attacks made by the other IAC members on the Director for not having taken action to date in the captured document field, except, of course, for the Foreign Documents Branch. Any proposed draft, therefore, should have such teeth, and if the IAC will not concur, it must follow the procedure set by NSCID 1 for reference to the NSC.

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